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Canada’s Supreme Court ruled that publishers need permission 
from freelance authors before reproducing their works in online 
databases. But in contrast to the approach taken in Europe and 
the US, publishers are now entitled to republish articles on CD-
ROM without asking or compensating the freelance authors. 
Ultimately, irrespective of the publishing medium, the Court 
defers to private ordering to clarify ambiguities in new use 
clauses that will continue to persist as technologies evolve to 
the detriment of freelancers. Thus this decision will have little, 
if any, impact in practice. 
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CANADA’S ROBERTSON RULING: ANY PRACTICAL 
SIGNIFICANCE FOR COPYRIGHT TREATMENT 
OF FREELANCE AUTHORS? 
Giuseppina D’Agostino 2006٭ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the Supreme Court of Canada decides a case, it can be 
hard to know who has won. All sides have declared victory in 
Robertson v Thomson Corp1 recently handed down by Canada’s 
top court. By a 5-4 split, the Court favoured freelance author, 
Heather Robertson, who sued The Globe & Mail in a class 
action lawsuit to stop newspapers and magazines reproducing 
freelance articles in online databases without permission (and 
compensation). Authors’ groups such as the Professional 
Writers’ Association of Canada (PWAC) triumphantly stated 
that the decision ‘has upheld freelance writers’ ownership and 
control of the work they produce (a fundamental tenet of 
                                            
• Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Canada; DPhil 
(Oxford); Barrister & Solicitor (LSUC 2001 call). The author would like to 
thank Professor David Vaver for his helpful comments and Dean Patrick 
Monahan and Mark Matz for their feedback on an earlier version of this 
article. Comments are welcome at gdagostino@osgoode.yorku.ca. 
1 (2001) 15 CPR (4th) 147 (SCJ); (2004), 34 CPR (4th) 161 (Ont CA); 2006 SCC 43 
(‘Robertson’). SCC decision released 12 October 2006. For a more 
comprehensive treatment of the general issues, please see G D’Agostino 
‘Freelance Authors for Free: Globalisation of Publishing, Convergence of 
Copyright Contracts and Divergence of Judicial Reasoning’ in F Macmillan 
(ed) New Directions in Copyright (Edward Elgar Cheltenham 2005) 166 and G 
D’Agostino ‘Copyright Treatment of Freelance Work in the Digital Era’ 
(2002) 19 Santa Clara Computer and High Technology LJ 37. 
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copyright law).’2 But The Globe also said in its statement that it 
was pleased overall.3 This is because the decision, for the first 
time, carved out the right for newspapers to republish articles on 
CD-ROM. Articles reproduced in CD-ROM were seen as 
“faithful” to the essence of the original print edition and 
therefore allowable reproductions by the newspaper without the 
authors’ permission.4  
But saying that authors own database rights and newspapers 
own CD-ROM rights is practically meaningless because, for 
both the majority and dissenting judges in Robertson, freedom 
to contract will always trump statute law. Each party 
theoretically has contractual freedom, but publishers as the 
party with the greater bargaining power dictate their terms to 
freelancers, who have little power to demand better treatment. 
This decision—sanctioning freedom of contract—will therefore 
have little, if any, impact in practice.  
Robertson may not conclusively resolve the question of which 
party owns and controls future exploitation rights. Rather, the 
Court defers to private ordering to clarify ambiguities in new 
use clauses that will continue to persist as technologies evolve, 
to the detriment of freelancers.  
                                            
2 Professional Writers Association of Canada (PWAC) ‘Professional Writers 
Welcome Supreme Court Decision’ (12 October 2006) 
http://www.pwac.ca/2006/10/writers-win.html 
3 J Ward ‘Supreme Court favours freelancers in copyright case’ Toronto Star 
(12 October 2006). 
4 Robertson SCC (n 1) [52]. 
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II. SOME BACKGROUND 
It is now old news that publishers of mainstream newspapers 
and magazines exploit authors’ works not only in print form but 
also digitally, on their own websites or by selling them to third 
party databases and CD-ROM companies. But this was of course 
not the practice before the onset of digital technologies. Before 
the 1990s freelancers customarily obtained additional 
compensation for translations, reprints, and other modifications 
of their work.5 With increased digitization, publishers have 
begun to use the digital economy as a new avenue to profit from 
authors’ works.   
Canada’s Supreme Court decision comes after a series of other 
freelancer-driven copyright infringement suits decided in 
continental Europe6 and the US,7 and settled in the UK.8 At issue 
is the period pre-dating electronic publication (before the 1990s) 
                                            
5 LA Santelli ‘Notes and Comments: New Battles between Freelancer 
Authors and Publishers in the Aftermath of Tasini v New York Times’(1998) 
7 JL & Policy 253–300, 262. 
6 eg in France: (3 February 1998) (Tribunal de Grande Instance de Strasbourg – 
Ordonnance de Référé Commercial) tr (1998) 22 Columbia-VLAJLA 199 
(Plurimédia). In Germany: Freelens (5 July 2001) No I ZR 311/98 Federal 
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) tr (2003) 34 IIC 227, 229 
7 Tasini v New York Times 533 US 483, 121 S Ct 2381 (2001)(‘Tasini’). Within 
Canada, there is another action working its way through the courts: 
Association des Journalistes indépendants du Québec (AJIQ) c. Cedrom-SNI 
[1999] JQ no 4609 (QSC); Electronic Rights Defence Committee (ERDC) c 
Southam Inc [1999] JQ no 349 (QBC). 
8 A settlement between The Guardian and its freelancers in 1999 stipulated 
that the newspaper company (1) stop the practice of coercing freelancers to 
assign copyright without fresh payment for their work, and (2) give 
freelancers 50 per cent of spot sales for one year; The Society of Authors 
(archives, London June 2003). I am very grateful to Mark Le Fanu for kindly 
allowing me access to these materials. 
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when there were no written contracts; only key terms such as 
the submission date and word count were agreed upon. And so, 
in all these cases, the agreements were oral and new use rights 
were not addressed. Freelancers argue that they receive no 
notice, give no consent, and obtain no payment for the 
exploitation of their works through these new digital uses. 
Publishers maintain that there is no difference between the 
media; in any event, because of contracts previously made with 
their freelancers they can exploit new uses of such works 
through an implied licence. Some publishers justify themselves 
by saying that they are investing millions of dollars in these new 
technologies and need a “wait and see” approach; others, that 
they are digitizing works all in the public interest.9 While the 
implied licence point is to some extent a question of evidence 
and interpretation, it speaks more fundamentally to the 
contractual nature of the freelancer-publisher relationship and 
to the ways in which the management of such new uses 
challenge ongoing publishing practices, and copyright law and 
policy generally. The central issue is whether authors’ contracts, 
by which copyright is transferred or licensed for reproduction, 
contemplate electronic publication rights.10 For staff writers in 
common law countries it is a moot point, since their employer 
owns the copyright in the work done “during the course of 
employment,” but for freelancers who base their livelihoods on 
each new contract, the issue is a vital one.11 In copyright law, 
                                            
9 De Volkskrant No D 3.1294 (24 September 1997) (DCt of Amsterdam) tr 
(1998) 22 Columbia-VLAJLA 181 argued for a three-year freeze before 
compensating authors as the technologies were in an “experimental stage”; 
on the public interest argument see Abella J’s dissent in Robertson SCC (n 1).   
10 Copyright Act RSC 1985 c C-42 (‘CCA’) s 3 setting out the bundle of 
economic rights (e.g. reproduction right) to which a copyright owner is 
entitled. 
11 CCA s 13(3); in the UK, Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 c 48 as 
amended s 11(2).  
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freelancers are independent contractors and so without an 
agreement stating otherwise, they are supposed to control the 
future exploitation rights over their works.  
III. CANADA’S ROBERTSON 
Robertson v Thomson Corp12 was a class action headed by 
Canadian author Heather Robertson who wrote for The Globe & 
Mail. The Globe entered into a letter agreement with 
Robertson’s publisher in August 1995 for one time usage of one 
of her works for a fee. There was no reference to electronic 
rights. In February 1996, The Globe entered into a written 
contract with numerous freelancers, which for the first time 
included an electronic rights clause. This clause was later 
expanded in December 1996.  
IV. IMPLIED LICENCE ISSUE IN THE LOWER COURTS 
The copyright contract issues were very much alive in the first 
instance decision. Following a US Supreme Court decision on 
the copyright infringement issue, Tasini v New York Times,13 
Cumming J ruled that the publishers had infringed the 
freelancers’ copyright since the reproductions constituted 
                                            
12 Robertson CA (n 1). 
13 533 US 483, 121 S Ct 2381 (2001) (Ginsburg J). Six freelancers sued three 
print publishers—New York Times (NYT), Newsday and Time Inc. The 
dispute centred on 21 articles written between 1990 and 1993, in which 
freelancers had registered copyrights. The publishers registered collective 
works copyrights in each edition in which the articles originally appeared. 
They engaged the authors as independent contractors under oral contracts 
that did not contemplate electronic publication. Under separate licensing 
agreements with database and CD-ROM companies, (LEXIS/NEXIS and 
University Microfilms International respectively), and without the consent of 
their freelancers, the publishers permitted copies of the freelancers’ articles to 
appear in electronic media.  
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individual copies of their works. In Tasini’s 7-2 decision, the US 
Supreme Court had ruled that, pursuant to US Copyright Act 
section 201(c), the publishers did not have the privilege to 
reproduce the stand-alone work but could reproduce the works 
only in context as part of the collective work. The US Court 
mainly focused on the differences between print and electronic 
media and did not address licensing issues which were argued in 
the lower courts.14  
Robertson at first instance found the licensing issues 
problematic and declined summary judgment as there was a 
genuine issue for trial. In interpreting section 13(4) of the 
Canadian Copyright Act, the Court held that the licence did not 
need to be in writing because it did not convey a proprietary 
interest: The Globe’s licence was “arguably nonexclusive” since 
the freelancer ‘retains the rights to publish and re-sell the 
individual work.’15 While the Court did not find that The Globe 
had a proprietary interest in the copyright, it left open the 
question as to whether there was in fact a licence between the 
parties, and if so, of what type. The decision left open the 
possibility that the defendant could have been entitled to a 
licence in the new electronic uses of the works. Conflicting 
evidence could not allow a summary ruling; freelancers were 
possibly aware of the existence of an online database long before 
1996.16 In 1996, The Globe had arguably merely codified the 
existing custom of electronically publishing freelancers’ works 
in its new standard contract; if freelancers did not want their 
works to be re-used they should have contracted out.17  
                                            
14 See discussion in D’Agostino 2002 (n 1) 2002.  
15 Robertson SCJ (n 1) 77. 
16 ibid 160. 
17 ibid 164-5. 
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On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed The Globe’s 
cross-appeal on copyright infringement and dismissed 
Robertson’s appeal on the implied licence. The Court held that 
Robertson had granted The Globe a valid oral licence that was 
non-proprietary and so did not need to be in writing. 
Nonetheless, the Court did not clarify the full extent of The 
Globe’s licence. It maintained that since Robertson admitted to 
allowing The Globe to publish her articles in print and to 
archive them on microfiche and microfilm, it ‘had a valid oral 
licence at least for these purposes.’18 Despite Robertson’s claim 
that she had not also licensed her database rights, the Court left 
it uncertain whether the oral licence would extend to this new 
medium, and whether the defences of laches and acquiescence 
applied.19 Instead, the Court miscast the issues and dwelt on 
delineating the differences between the media on the question of 
copyright infringement (although it purported not to be 
following a US approach). 20  
V. ROBERTSON SUPREME COURT RULING “OF LESS 
PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE”  
The Supreme Court did not settle the licensing issue. It too 
focused on delineating the differences between media. It ruled 
that reproduction of the articles on the databases did prima facie 
infringe Robertson’s copyright. Once again applying Tasini, it 
                                            
18 Robertson CA [96] [emphasis mine] 
19 W. Matheson, Robertson Defence Counsel, Phone Interview (18 July 2002). 
20 In making the argument that Canada followed a US approach even though 
it claimed not to do so, see G D’Agostino ‘Anticipating Robertson: Defining 
Copyright Ownership of Freelance works in New Media (18)(1) Cahiers de 
Propriété Intellectuelle 2006 tr « En attendant Robertson : Définir la 
possession du droit d'auteur sur les œuvres des pigistes dans les nouveaux 
médias » 166; see D’Agostino 2005 (n 1) for a detailed discussion on the 
differences between the media.  
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adopted a “decontextualization” test. The articles reproduced in 
the databases had lost their “intimate connection” with the 
newspaper and were no longer represented in its context.21 On 
the other hand, in a unique twist from Tasini’s holding where all 
media was found to be infringing, the CD-ROM articles were 
held to be allowable reproductions as these remained “faithful” 
to the newspaper.22 Here the Court’s interpretation of the 
decontextualisation test is technology-dependent and its future 
application is unclear as technology is ever-evolving.23  
Significantly, the Supreme Court did not rule on the licensing 
issues; these remain a triable issue. It merely agreed with the 
appellate court that an exclusive licence need not be in writing.24 
The Court, however, did affirm that the looming trial, and not 
its own decision, would finally resolve such issues. For the 
Court, ‘this decision, will of course, be of less practical 
significance. Parties are, have been, and will continue to be free, 
to alter by contract the rights established by the Copyright 
Act.’25 This is a very strong pronouncement on the persisting 
power of freedom of contract to trump any statutory-based right. 
Publishers have already generated standardized “all rights” 
contracts where they own all digital rights. And so, this decision 
is only relevant for the pre-electronic publication period where 
there were no written contracts and no mention of digital rights. 
But even for this pre-electronic period, the Court’s finding that 
database reproduction was a prima facie infringement may be 
                                            
21 Robertson SCC (n 1) [41]. 
22 ibid [52]. 
23 Others argue that this poses an “extra” hurdle for right holders to prove in a 
copyright infringement suit, thereby changing the scope of the reproduction 
right: B Sookman ‘Reading, Writing, Robertson’ (OBA Conference, Toronto 
23 November 2006). 
24 Robertson SCC (n 1) [56]. 
25 Robertson SCC (n 1) [58]. 
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trumped if a lower court finds facts from which an implied 
contract allowing reproduction may be inferred. Freelancers may 
therefore end up with no rights. 
And so the majority opinion, seemingly more sympathetic to 
freelancers, acknowledges that it has not even begun to scratch 
the surface of the real issue: had freelancers impliedly given 
away their digital rights in the first place? Who owns the digital 
rights for that pre-electronic time period remains a live issue.  
 
But freedom of contract does not always have the last word. The 
Court is only partly accurate here. At least in the UK, which 
provided the model for Canada’s copyright statute, publishers’ 
freedom to contract has been restricted when dealing with 
parties with weaker bargaining power, such as freelancers.26 And 
where the law failed, courts would often step in and even the 
playing field by giving publishers fewer rights in the contracts.27 
If such precedents had been considered in Robertson, the 
contract issues may well have been solved in the authors’ 
favour. Publishers, aware of these constraints, may now have 
had more incentive to contract for very precise terms for each of 
their digital rights. Indeed, as argued elsewhere, courts may do 
well to adopt a restrictive interpretive approach and read in no 
more terms than necessary to give business efficacy to the 
contract.28 
                                            
26 See D’Agostino 2006 (n 20) 177 discussing the UK 1842 Copyright Act 5 & 
6 Vict c 45  
27 ibid discussing cases such as Hall-Brown v Iliffe & Sons Ltd (1910–1935) 
Mac CC 88 ChD (20 Dec 1929). 
28 D’Agostino 2006 (n 20) 167. 
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In Canada freedom of contract is subject to an ancient body of 
equitable doctrine by which courts check contracts for 
unconscionable conduct and terms. English decisions in the 
music industry invalidating one-sided contracts unfairly reached 
by producers with inexperienced musicians will likely be 
followed, and likely expanded on, in Canada29 
Nor does the Court’s decision stop parliament—the final 
adjudicator on copyright policy—from enacting laws to address 
copyright contract issues (e.g. more specific provisions on 
licensing). Such issues were flagged in the government of 
Canada’s report Supporting Culture and Innovation (October 
2002)30 but ultimately have not made governments’ priority lists.  
Freelancers are a growing category of cultural workers. More and 
more work is being outsourced. New means of technology 
continue to be invented and open up new markets of 
exploitation and new challenges to today’s standardized 
contracts and publishing practices. Allowing full freedom of 
contract will mean that publishers, with their greater bargaining 
power, will take the greater share of the fruits of new technology 
markets, at the expense of authors. 
For the Robertson dissent, this last result would seem just fine. 
The dissenters seemed to go even farther than the majority in 
allowing publishers’ free rein. They mentioned Tasini without 
disapproval, where the publishers lost and in retaliation purged 
                                            
29 Schroeder v McCauley [1974] 1 WLR 1308 (HL); O’Sullivan v Management 
Agency and Music Ltd [1985] 3 All ER 351 (full discussion of equity as 
applied to freelancers in G D’Agostino Towards a Balanced Copyright 
Treatment of Freelance Authors (Bodleian Library, Oxford 2004) (forthcoming 
in Edward Elgar 2007). 
30 Also known as the “Section 92 Report.”  
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authors’ works from their online databases.31 The New York 
Times has purged approximately 115,000 affected articles. To 
avoid a similar purging in Canada that would go against the 
“public interest,” the dissenters paradoxically ruled for the 
publishers. There is a great “public interest” purpose, they said, 
in archived newspapers: ‘these materials are a primary resource 
for teachers, students, writers, reporters, and researchers.’32 But 
no-one disputes that publishers can copy their newspapers: 
rather the issue is whether they can just use individual freelance 
articles elsewhere without asking or for free (or violate authors’ 
moral rights—an issue not raised in the case). Nor does anyone 
dispute that archived newspapers serve the public interest. But 
this does not mean that publishers always prioritize what is in 
the public interest over what is in their shareholders’ interests. 
The New York Times proved this by punishing authors and the 
public by its policy of purging. The dissent also implied that 
rewarding authors is against the public interest a position which 
falsely pits authors against the public. If we want to nourish the 
public interest, we cannot rely only on private interests. At least 
Tasini’s dissent deferred to the US government and said that 
these issues merit further study. For instance, there is no reason 
why licensing schemes parallel to those in the music industry 
could not evolve to compensate authors and ensure users greater 
access and diversity of works. Such a creative solution may 
accommodate all parties in the public interest. 
                                            
31 After Tasini, The New York Times adopted a policy to accept only freelance 
works for which authors expressly surrendered all of their copyright. The 
New York Times forced its freelancers to choose between: (1) whether to 
press for compensation, or (2) forego compensation in favour of keeping their 
articles in the electronic databases at a time when freelancers had limited 
information, since the damage awards were yet to be determined. Moreover, 
The New York Times blacklisted those freelancers who brought forward the 
claim. 
32 Robertson SCC (n 1) [70]. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
What the Robertson Court left the parties with is a copyright 
test that is a “question of degree” and will lead to much future 
guess-work.33 Even publishers need more than this for certainty’s 
sake. Resolving the live contract issue in Robertson may not 
close the door on newer uncertainties in future copyright 
contracts. Bright line rules will be necessary to guide both 
parties and courts.  
As in the past, today, even within Canada, Québec stands out as 
a province that has attempted to clarify and protect authors’ 
rights through legislation.34 Similarly, across Europe, various 
laws manage copyright contracts so that contracts may be 
arrived at equitably and so that freedom to contract does not 
undermine public policy.35 
The government and parliament in common law countries such 
as Canada would do well to learn from the past and the present 
as signaled by Robertson. They should produce legislation that 
avoids courts from having to do their job for them in the future.  
                                            
33 ibid [40]. 
34 The Act Respecting the Professional Status of Artists in the Visual Arts, 
Arts and Crafts and Literature, and Their Contracts with Promoters (1988) 
RSQ c S-32.01 discussed in D’Agostino (n 30). 
35 See discussion in D’Agostino 2005 (n 1) on national legislation in Europe, 
eg in France, Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle No 92-587 of 1 July 1992 as 
last amended by Order 2001-670 of 25 July 2001 (‘CPI’). 
